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We give a security proof of the ‘Round Robin Differential Phase Shift’ Quantum Key Distribution
scheme, and we give a tight bound on the required amount of privacy amplification. Our proof
consists of the following steps. We construct an EPR variant of the scheme. We identify Eve’s
optimal way of coupling an ancilla to an EPR qudit pair under the constraint that the bit error rate
between Alice and Bob should not exceed a value β. As a function of β we derive, for finite key size,
the trace distance between the real state and a state in which no leakage exists. For asymptotic
key size we obtain a bound on the trace distance by computing the von Neumann entropy. Our
asymptotic result for the privacy amplification is sharper than existing bounds.
1 Introduction
1.1 Quantum Key Distribution and the RRDPS scheme
Quantum-physical information processing is different from classical information processing in sev-
eral remarkable ways. Performing a measurement on an unknown quantum state typically destroys
information; It is impossible to clone an unknown state by unitary evolution [1]; Quantum en-
tanglement is a form of correlation between subsystems that does not exist in classical physics.
Numerous ways have been devised to exploit these quantum properties for security purposes [2].
By far the most popular and well studied type of protocol is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).
QKD was first proposed in a famous paper by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [3]. Given that Alice
and Bob have a way to authenticate classical messages to each other (typically a short key), and
that there is a quantum channel from Alice to Bob, QKD allows them to create a random key
of arbitrary length about which Eve knows practically nothing. BB84 works with two conjugate
bases in a two-dimensional Hilbert space. Many QKD variants have since been described in the
literature [4,5,6,7,8,9], using e.g. different sets of qubit states, EPR pairs, qudits instead of qubits,
or continuous variables. Furthermore, various proof techniques have been developed [10,11,12,13].
In 2014, Sasaki, Yamamoto and Koashi introduced Round-Robin Differential Phase-Shift (RRDPS)
[14], a QKD scheme based on d-dimenional qudits. It has the advantage that it is very noise resilient
while being easy to implement using photon pulse trains and interference measurements. One of
the interesting aspects of RRDPS is that it is possible to omit the monitoring of signal disturbance.
Even at high disturbance, Eve can obtain little information IAE about Alice’s secret bit. The value
of IAE determines how much privacy amplification is needed. As a result of this, the maximum
possible QKD rate (the number of actual key bits conveyed per quantum state) is 1−h(β)− IAE,
where h is the binary entropy function and β the bit error rate.1
1.2 Prior work on the security of RRDPS
The security of RRDPS has been discussed in a number of papers [14,16,17,18]. The original
RRDPS paper gives an upper bound for asymptotic key length,
IAE ≤ h( 1
d− 1) (1)
1 Monitoring of signal disturbance induces a small penalty on the QKD rate. However, the number of qubits
that needs to be discarded is only logarithmic in the length of the derived key [15] and hence we will ignore the
penalty.
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(Eq. 5 in [14] with photon number set to 1). The security analysis in [14] is based on an entropic
inequality for non-commuting measurements. There are two issues with this analysis. First, the
proof is not written out in detail. Second, it is not known how tight the bound is.
Ref. [16] follows [14] and does a more accurate computation of phase error rate, tightening the
1/(d− 1) in (1) to 1/d. In [17] Sasaki and Koashi add β-dependence to their analysis and claim a
bound
IAE ≤ h( 2β
d− 2) for β ≤
1
2
· d− 2
d− 1 (2)
and IAE ≤ h( 1d−1 ) for β ∈ [ 12 · d−2d−1 , 12 ]. The analysis in [18] considers only intercept-resend attacks,
and hence puts a lower bound on Eve’s potential knowledge, IAE ≥ 1− h( 12 + 1d ) = O(1/d2).2
1.3 Contributions and outline
In this paper we give a security proof of RRDPS in the case of coherent attacks. We give a bound
on the required amount of privacy amplification. We adopt a proof technique inspired by [11], [13]
and [10]. We consider the case where Alice and Bob do monitor the channel (i.e. they are able to
tune the amount of privacy amplification (PA) as a function of the observed bit error rate) as well
as the saturated regime where the leakage does not depend on the amount of noise.
– We show that the RRDPS protocol is equivalent to a protocol that contains an additional ran-
domisation step by Alice and Bob. The randomisation consists of phase flips and a permutation
of the basis states. We construct an EPR variant of RRDPS-with-randomisation; it is equivalent
to RRDPS if Alice creates the EPR pair and immediately does her measurement.3 The effect of
the randomisation is that Alice and Bob’s entangled state after Eve’s attack on the EPR pair
is symmetrised and can be described using just four real degrees of freedom.
– We identify Eve’s optimal way of coupling an ancilla to an EPR qudit pair under the constraint
that the bit error rate between Alice and Bob does not exceed some value β.
– We consider an attack where Eve applies the above coupling to each EPR qudit-pair individ-
ually. We compute an upper bound on the statistical distance of the full QKD key (after PA)
from uniformity, conditioned on Eve’s ancilla states. From this we derive how much privacy
amplification is needed. The result does not depend on the way in which Eve uses her ancillas,
i.e. she may apply a postponed coherent measurement on the whole system of ancillas.
– We compute the von Neumann mutual information between one ancilla state and Alice’s secret
bit. This provides a bound on the leakage in the asymptotic (long key) regime [12]. Our result
is sharper than [14].
– We provide a number of additional results by way of supplementary information. (i) We show
that Eve’s ancilla coupling can be written as a unitary operation on the Bob-Eve system.
This means that the attack can be executed even if Eve has no access to Alice’s qudit; this is
important especially in the reduction from the EPR version to the original RRDPS. (ii) We
compute the min-entropy of one secret bit given the corresponding ancilla. (iii) We compute
the accessible information (mutual Shannon entropy) of one secret bit given the corresponding
ancilla. The min-entropy and accessible-information results are relevant for collective attacks.
In Section 2 we introduce notation and briefly summarise the RRDPS scheme, the attacker model,
and extraction of classical information from (mixed) quantum states. Section 3 states the main
result: the amount of privacy amplification needed for RRDPS to be secure, (i) at finite key length
and (ii) asymptotically. The remainder of the paper builds towards the proof of these results, and
provides supplementary information about the leakage in terms of min-entropy loss and accessible
(Shannon) information.
In Section 4 we show that the randomisation step does not modify RRDPS, and we introduce the
EPR version of the protocol. In Section 5 we impose the constraint that Eve’s actions must not
2 Ref. [18] gives a min-entropy of − log( 1
2
+ 1
d
), which translates to Shannon entropy h( 1
2
+ 1
d
).
3 This is similar to the Shor-Preskill technique [11].
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cause a bit error rate higher than β, and determine which mixed states of the Alice-Bob system
are still allowed. There are only two scalar degrees of freedom left, which we denote as µ and V .
In Section 6 we do the purification of the Alice-Bob mixed state, thus obtaining an expression
for the state of Eve’s ancilla. Although the ancilla space has dimension d2, we show that only a
four-dimensional subspace is relevant for the analysis. In Section 7 we prove the non-asymptotic
main result by deriving an upper bound on the statistical distance between the distribution of the
QKD key and the uniform distribution, conditioned on Eve’s ancillas. In Section 8 we prove the
asymptotic result by computing Eve’s knowledge in terms of von Neumann entropy. In Section 9
we study collective attacks. Section 10 compares our results to previous bounds.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and terminology
Classical Random Variables (RVs) are denoted with capital letters, and their realisations with
lowercase letters. The probability that a RV X takes value x is written as Pr[X = x]. The
expectation with respect to RV X is denoted as Exf(x) =
∑
x∈X Pr[X = x]f(x). The constrained
sum
∑
t,t′:t 6=t′ is abbreviated as
∑
[tt′] and Eu,v:u6=v as E[uv]. The Shannon entropy of X is written
as H(X). Sets are denoted in calligraphic font. The notation ‘log’ stands for the logarithm with
base 2. The min-entropy of X ∈ X is Hmin(X) = − log maxx∈X Pr[X = x], and the conditional
min-entropy is Hmin(X|Y ) = − logEy maxx∈X Pr[X = x|Y = y]. The notation h stands for the
binary entropy function h(p) = p log 1p+(1−p) log 11−p . Bitwise XOR of binary strings is written as
‘⊕’. The Kronecker delta is denoted as δab. For quantum states we use Dirac notation. The notation
‘tr’ stands for trace. The Hermitian conjugate of an operator A is written as A†. When A is a
complicated expression, we sometimes write (A+ h.c.) instead of A+A†. The complex conjugate
of z is denoted as z∗. We use the Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM) formalism. A POVM
M consists of positive semidefinite operators,M = (Mx)x∈X , Mx ≥ 0, and satisfies the condition∑
xMx = 1. The trace norm of A is ‖A‖1 = tr
√
A†A. The trace distance between matrices ρ
and σ is denoted as D(ρ, σ) = 12 ‖ρ− σ‖1; it is a generalisation of the statistical distance and
represents the maximum possible advantage one can have in distinguishing ρ from σ.
Consider a uniform classical variable X and a mixed state ρ(X) that depends on X. The combined
quantum-classical state is Ex|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ(x). The statistical distance between X and a uniform
variable given ρ(X) is a measure of the security of X given ρ. This distance is given by [19]
D(X|ρ(X)) def= D(Ex|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ(x), Ex|x〉〈x| ⊗ Ex′ρ(x′)), (3)
i.e. the distance between the true quantum-classical state and a state in which the quantum state
is decoupled from X. The term Privacy Amplification is abbreviated as PA.
2.2 (Min-)entropy of a classical variable given a quantum state
The notation M(ρ) stands for the classical RV resulting when M is applied to mixed state ρ.
Consider a bipartite system ‘AB’ where the ‘A’ part is classical, i.e. the state is of the form
ρAB = Ex∈X |x〉〈x|⊗ρx with the |x〉 forming an orthonormal basis. The min-entropy of the classical
RV X given part ‘B’ of the system is [20]
Hmin(X|ρX) = − log maxM Ex∈X tr [Mxρx]. (4)
HereM = (Mx)x∈X denotes a POVM. Let Λ def=
∑
x ρxMx. If a POVM can be found that satisfies
the condition4 [21]
∀x∈X : Λ− ρx ≥ 0, (5)
4 Ref. [21] specifies a second condition, namely Λ† = Λ. However, the hermiticity of Λ already follows from the
condition (5).
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then there can be no better POVM for guessing X (but equally good POVMs may exist). For
states that also depend on a classical RV Y ∈ Y, the min-entropy of X given the quantum state
and Y is
Hmin(X|Y, ρX(Y )) = − logEy∈Y maxM Ex∈X tr [Mxρx(y)]. (6)
A simpler expression is obtained when X is a binary variable. Let X ∈ {0, 1}.
Then
X ∼ (p0, p1) :
Hmin (X|Y, ρX(Y )) = − log
(
1
2
+
1
2
Eytr
∥∥∥p0ρ0(y)− p1ρ1(y)∥∥∥
1
)
. (7)
This generalizes in a straightforward manner for states that depend on multiple classical RVs. The
Shannon entropy of a classical variable given a measurement on a quantum state is given by
H(X|ρX) = minM H(X|M(ρX)). (8)
The ‘accessible information’ is defined as the mutual information H(X) − H(X|ρX). In contrast
to the min-entropy case, there is no simple test analogous to (5) which tells you whether a local
minimum in (8) is a global minimum.
2.3 The RRDPS scheme in a nutshell
The dimension of the qudit space is d. The basis states5 are denoted as |t〉, with time indices
t ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}. Whenever we use notation “t1 + t2” it should be understood that the addition
of time indices is modulo d. The RRDPS scheme consists of the following steps.
1. Alice generates a random bitstring a ∈ {0, 1}d. She prepares the single-photon state
|µa〉 def= 1√
d
d−1∑
t=0
(−1)at |t〉 (9)
and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a random integer r ∈ {1, . . . , d − 1}. Bob performs a POVM measurement M(r)
described by a set of 2d operators (M
(r)
ks )k∈{0,...,d−1},s∈{0,1},
M
(r)
ks =
1
2
|Ψ (r)ks 〉〈Ψ (r)ks | |Ψ (r)ks 〉 =
|k〉+ (−1)s|k + r〉√
2
. (10)
The result of the measurementM(r) on |µa〉 is an random integer k ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} and a bit
s = ak ⊕ ak+r.6
3. Bob announces k and r over a public but authenticated channel. Alice computes s = ak⊕ak+r.
Alice and Bob now have a shared secret bit s.
This procedure is repeated multiple times.
To detect eavesdropping, Alice and Bob can compare a randomly selected fraction of their secret
bits. If this comparison is not performed, Alice and Bob have to assume that Eve learns as much
as when causing bit error rate β = 12 . This mode of operation (without monitoring) was proposed
in the original RRDPS paper [14].
Finally, on the remaining bits Alice and Bob carry out the standard procedures of information
reconciliation and privacy amplification.
5 The physical implementation [14] is a pulse train: a photon is split into d coherent pieces which are released
at different, equally spaced, points in time.
6 The phase (−1)ak⊕ak+r is the phase of the field oscillation in the (k + r)’th pulse relative to the k’th. The
measurement M(r) is an interference measurement where one path is delayed by r time units.
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The security of RRDPS is intuitively understood as follows. A measurement in a d-dimensional
space cannot extract more than log d bits of information. The state |µa〉, however, contains d− 1
pieces of information, which is a lot more than log d. Eve can learn only a fraction of the string
a embedded in the qudit. Furthermore, what information she has is of limited use, because she
cannot force Bob to select specific phases. (i) She cannot force Bob to choose a specific r value.
(ii) Even if she feeds Bob a state of the form |Ψ (r)`u 〉, where r accidentally equals Bob’s r, then
there is a 12 probability that Bob’s measurement M(r) yields k 6= ` with random s.
2.4 Attacker model; channel monitoring
There is a quantum channel from Alice to Bob. There is an authenticated but non-confidential clas-
sical channel between Alice and Bob. We allow Eve to attack individual qudit positions in any way
allowed by the laws of quantum physics, e.g. using unbounded quantum memory, entanglement,
lossless operations, arbitrary POVMs, arbitrary unitary operators etc. All bit errors observed by
Alice and Bob are assumed to be caused by Eve. Eve cannot influence the random choices of Alice
and Bob, nor the state of their (measurement) devices. There are no side channels. This is the
standard attacker model for quantum-cryptographic schemes. We consider the following channel
monitoring technique. Alice and Bob test the bit error rate for each combination (a, k) separately,
demanding that for each (a, k) the observed bit error rate does not exceed β˜ < β.7 Furthermore
they test if k is uniform for every a. Since Eve has no control over r, passing these tests implies
that for all (a, k, r) the bit error probability does not exceed β with overwhelming probability.8
The number of ‘sacrificed’ qudits required to implement all the tests on the bit error rate is of
order 2d · d · log κ, where κ is the length of the final key [15]. We will assume that n is chosen
sufficiently large to ensure d2d log κ n.
We will analyze an attack in which Eve couples an ancilla to each EPR pair individually in the
same way, i.e. causing the same bit error probability (β). This looks like a serious restriction on
Eve. However, it will turn out (Section 7) that the leakage is a concave function of β, which means
that it is sub-optimal for Eve to use different ways of coupling for different EPR pairs.
We will see that the leakage becomes constant when β reaches a saturation point. If Alice and
Bob are willing to tolerate such a noise level, then channel monitoring is no longer necessary for
determining the leakage; they just assume that the maximum possible leakage occurs. (Monitoring
is still necessary to determine which error-correcting code should be applied.)
Note that for large d it becomes impractical to determine the bit error rate for each combination
(a, k) individually due to the exponential factor 2d; the saturation value of the leakage should be
assumed.
3 Main results
Our first result is a non-asymptotic bound on the secrecy of the QKD key.
Theorem 1 Let r = (r1, . . . , rn) be the values of the parameter r in n rounds of RRDPS, and
similarly k = (k1, . . . , kn). Let z ∈ {0, 1}` be the QKD key derived from the n rounds. Let u be the
(public) random seed used in the privacy amplification. Let ω(z, u, r,k) be the joint state of Eve’s
n ancillas. The distance of Z from uniformity, given all Eve’s available information, classical and
quantum, can be bounded as
D(Z|U, r,k, ω(Z,U, r,k)) < 1
2
√
2`−n(1−2 log T ) (11)
7 The gap between β˜ and β must be properly chosen as a function of the number of samples and the required
confidence level.
8 Any statistical uncertainty about the uniformity of k due to finite sample size can be represented as a statistical
distance δsampl between the real state and the state that satisfies the constraints. The parameter δsampl will then
appear, via the triangle inequality, as an additional term in the expression for the trace distance in Theorems 1
and 2.
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where T is given by
β ≤ β∗ : T = 2β +
√
1− 2β
[√
1− 2β d− 1
d− 2 +
√
2β√
d− 2
]
(12)
β ≥ β∗ : T = 2β∗ +
√
1− 2β∗
[√
1− 2β∗ d− 1
d− 2 +
√
2β∗√
d− 2
]
(13)
and β∗ is a saturation value that depends on d as
β∗ =
xd/2
1 + xd
, (14)
where xd is the solution on (0, 1) of the equation
(1− x
d− 2)
1
2 + (1 +
1
d− 2)(1−
x
d− 2)
− 12 +
1√
d− 2(
√
x− 1√
x
)− 2 = 0. (15)
For asymptotically large n, it has been shown [19], using the properties of smooth Re´nyi entropies,
that D(Z| · · ·) ≤ 12
√
2`−n(1−IAE), where IAE is the single-qudit von Neumann information leakage
S(E)− S(E|S′). Here ‘E’ stands for Eve’s ancilla state and S′ is Alice’s secret bit.
Our second result is a computation of the von Neumann leakage IAE for RRDPS.
Theorem 2 The information leakage about the secret bit S’ given R, K and Eve’s quantum state,
in terms of von Neumann entropy, is given by:
β ≤ β0 : IAE = (1− 2β)h( 1
d− 2 ·
2β
1− 2β ) (16)
β ≥ β0 : IAE = (1− 2β0)h( 1
d− 2 ·
2β0
1− 2β0 ). (17)
Here β0 is a saturation value (different from β∗) given by
β0 =
1
2
[
1 +
1
(d− 2)(1− yd)
]−1
(18)
where yd is the unique positive root of the polynomial y
d−1 + y − 1.
The theorems are proven in Sections 7 and 8. The formulation of the security in terms of statis-
tical distance ensures that the results are Universally Composable. In Section 8 we will see that
Theorem 2 is sharper than (2) and hence allows for a higher QKD rate `/n.
4 Symmetrised EPR version of the protocol
4.1 RRDPS is equivalent to RRDPS with random permutations
We show that inserting a symmetrisation step into RRDPS does not affect the protocol. More
specifically, the following protocol is equivalent to RRDPS.
S1 Alice picks a random a ∈ {0, 1}d and a random permutation pi. She prepares |µa〉 = 1√d
∑
t(−1)at |t〉.
S2 Alice performs the permutation pi on the state |µa〉. She sends the result to Bob. After pausing
for a while, she sends pi to Bob.
S3 Eve does something with the state, without knowing pi. Then she sends the result to Bob.
S4 Bob receives a state and stores it until he receives pi. Bob applies pi−1 to the state.
S5 Bob picks a random r ∈ {1, . . . , d − 1} and does the M(r) POVM. The result is an index
k ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} and a bit s = ak ⊕ ak+r. He computes ` = k + r mod d. He announces k, `.
S6 Alice computes s′ = ak ⊕ a`.
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The equivalence is shown as follows. After step S2, the state is 1√
d
∑
t(−1)at |pi(t)〉
= 1√
d
∑
τ (−1)api−1τ |τ〉 = |µpi−1(a)〉. Hence Alice’s process {state preparation followed by pi} can be
replaced by {acting with pi−1 on a followed by state preparation}. Similarly, Bob’s process {apply
pi−1 to state; pick random r; do M(r); send k, `} has exactly the same effect as {pick random r;
doM(r); apply pi to k, l; send pi(k), pi(`)}. Next, Bob’s computation of pi(k), pi(`) can be moved to
Alice. Then, Alice’s actions {pick random a; send pi−1(a) to state preparation; send a to step S6}
can be replaced by {pick random a′; send a′ to state preparation; send pi(a) to step S6}. Finally,
in step S6 we use pi(a)pi(k) = ak and pi(a)pi(`) = a`.
Remark. In step S3 it is crucial that Eve does not know pi at the moment of her manipulation of
the state. This will allow us to derive a symmetrised form of the density matrix in Section 4.3.
4.2 RRDPS is equivalent to RRDPS with random phase flips
Analogous with Section 4.1, it can be seen that adding an extra phase-flipping step to RRDPS
does not affect RRDPS. Consider the following protocol.
F1 Alice picks a random a ∈ {0, 1}d and a random c ∈ {0, 1}d. She prepares |µa〉 = 1√d
∑
t(−1)at |t〉.
F2 Alice performs the phase flips on the state |µa〉, according to the rule |t〉 → (−1)ct |t〉 for basis
states. She sends the result to Bob. After pausing for a while, she sends c to Bob.
F3 Eve does something with the state, without knowing c. Then she sends the result to Bob.
F4 Bob receives a state and stores it until he receives c. Bob applies phase flips c to the state.
F5 Bob picks a random r ∈ {1, . . . , d − 1} and does the M(r) POVM. The result is an index
k ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} and a bit s = ak ⊕ ak+r. He computes ` = k + r mod d. He announces k, `.
F6 Alice computes s′ = ak ⊕ a`.
The equivalence to RRDPS is seen as follows. After step F2 the state is |µa⊕c〉. Hence Alice’s
process {pick random a; prepare state; flip with c} is equivalent to {pick random a; flip with c;
prepare state}. Similarly, Bob’s process {flip with c; pick random r; do M(r)} is equivalent to
{pick random r; do M(r); change s to s ⊕ ck ⊕ c` }. This holds because in the first case Bob
obtains s = (a⊕ c)k ⊕ (a⊕ c)` = (ak ⊕ a`)⊕ ck ⊕ c`. Furthermore, Alice’s steps {pick random a;
send a to computation of s′ and flipped a to state preparation} are equivalent to {pick random
a′; send flipped a to computation of s′ and a′ to state preparation}. The final effect of these
transformations of the ‘F’ protocol is that (i) there is no physical phase flipping at all, (ii) Bob
needs no quantum memory, and (iii) Alice and Bob both obtain a secret bit (ak ⊕ a`) ⊕ ck ⊕ c`;
though not equal to ak ⊕ a`, it is statistically the same.
4.3 EPR version
We introduce a protocol based on EPR pairs that is equivalent to the combined ‘S’ and ‘F’
protocols, and hence also equivalent to RRDPS.
E1 A maximally entangled two-qudit state is prepared.
|α0〉 def= 1√
d
d−1∑
t=0
|tt〉. (19)
One qudit (‘A’) is intended for Alice, and one (‘B’) for Bob.
E2 Eve does something with the EPR pair. Then Alice and Bob each receive their own qudit.
E3 Alice and Bob pick a random permutation pi. They both apply pi to their own qudit. Then they
forget pi.
E4 Alice and Bob pick a random string c ∈ {0, 1}d. They both apply phase flips |t〉 → (−1)ct |t〉
to their own qudit. Then they forget c.
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E5 Alice performs a POVM Q = (Qz)z∈{0,1}d on her own qudit, where
Qz =
d
2d
|µz〉〈µz|. (20)
This results in a measured string a ∈ {0, 1}d.
E6 Bob picks a random integer r ∈ {1, . . . , d − 1} and performs the POVM measurement M(r)
on his qudit. The result of the measurement is an integer k ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1} and a bit s. Bob
computes ` = k + r mod d. Bob announces k, `.
E7 Alice computes s′ = ak ⊕ a`.
The equivalence to the protocol in Section 4.1 is seen as follows. First, let Alice be the origin of
the EPR pair, and let her perform Q as soon as she has created the EPR pair. This process is
equivalent to preparing a qudit state |µa〉 with random a. The only difference is that the EPR
protocol allows Eve to couple her ancilla to the AB system instead of only the B system. Hence
the EPR version overestimates Eve’s power. Security of the EPR version implies security of the
original RRDPS.9 Furthermore, the permutations and phase flips in steps E3,E4 cancel out exactly
like in protocols ‘S’ and ‘F’.
Remark: The protocol equivalences is Sections 4.1–4.3 can be nicely visualised using diagrammatic
techniques [22]. We do not show the protocol diagrams in this paper.
Lemma 1 The hermitian matrices Qz as defined in (20) form a POVM, i.e.
∑
z∈{0,1}d Qz = 1.
Proof:∑
z |µz〉〈µz| =
∑
z
1
d
∑d−1
t,t′=0(−1)zt′+zt |t〉〈t′| = 1d
∑d−1
t,t′=0 |t〉〈t′|
∑
z(−1)zt′+zt .
Using
∑
z(−1)zt′+zt = 2dδtt′ we get
∑
z |µz〉〈µz| = 2
d
d
∑
t |t〉〈t| = 2
d
d 1. 
Alice and Bob’s measurements can be carried out in the opposite order. It is not important
whether Q is practical or not; it is a theoretical construct which allows us to build an EPR version
of RRDPS.
4.4 Effect of the random transforms: state symmetrisation
Let ρAB denote the pure EPR state of Alice and Bob, and let ρˆAB be the mixed state of the AB
system after Eve’s manipulation in step E2. We write
ρˆAB =
∑
t,t′,τ,τ ′∈{0,...,d−1}
ρˆtt
′
ττ ′ |t, t′〉〈τ, τ ′|, (21)
with ρˆττ
′
tt′ = (ρˆ
tt′
ττ ′)
∗ and
∑
tt′ ρˆ
tt′
tt′ = 1. The effect of step E3 is that the AB state gets averaged
over all permutations, i.e. we get the following mapping
ρˆAB 7→ ρ˜AB def= 1
d!
∑
pi
∑
t,t′,τ,τ ′
ρˆ
pi(t),pi(t′)
pi(τ),pi(τ ′)|t, t′〉〈τ, τ ′| (22)
def
=
∑
t,t′,τ,τ ′
ρ˜tt
′
ττ ′ |t, t′〉〈τ, τ ′|. (23)
Here the parameters ρ˜tt
′
ττ ′ are invariant under simultaneous permutation of the four indices, i.e.
ρ˜
pi(t),pi(t′)
pi(τ),pi(τ ′) = ρ˜
tt′
ττ ′ for all pi,t,t
′,τ ,τ ′. The consequence is that ρ˜AB contains only a few degrees of
freedom, namely the constants ρ˜ssss, ρ˜
ss
st , ρ˜
ss
ts , ρ˜
ss
tt , ρ˜
st
st, ρ˜
st
ts, ρ˜
ss
tu, ρ˜
st
su, ρ˜
ts
us, ρ˜
st
us, ρ˜
st
uv, where s, t, u, v are
mutually distinct.
9 In Appendix A it will turn out that Eve’s optimal attack is achieved by acting on Bob’s qudit only; hence the
EPR version is fully equivalent to original RRDPS.
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Next, the random phase flips reduce the degrees of freedom even further. Let Fc be the phase flip
operator.
ρ¯AB
def
= Ec∈{0,1}dFcρ˜
ABF †c (24)
= Ec
∑
tt′ττ ′
ρ˜tt
′
ττ ′(−1)ct+ct′+cτ+cτ′ |t, t′〉〈τ, τ ′| (25)
=
∑
tt′ττ ′
|t, t′〉〈τ, τ ′|ρ˜tt′ττ ′Ec(−1)ct+ct′+cτ+cτ′ (26)
def
=
∑
tt′ττ ′
|t, t′〉〈τ, τ ′|ρ¯tt′ττ ′ . (27)
From (26) we see that any time index that occurs an odd number of times will be wiped out, i.e.
Ec(−1)ct = 0. The only surviving degrees of freedom are the constants ρ¯ssss, ρ¯sstt , ρ¯stst and ρ¯stts (all
with t 6= s and arbitrary s, t). Note that all four constants all real-valued.
5 Imposing the noise constraint
The channel monitoring restricts the ways in which Eve can alter the AB state without being
detected. We will determine the most general allowed ρ¯AB that is compatible with bit error rate β
for all values of (a, k, r, s). (We will later see that it is optimal for Eve to cause the same bit error
rate in all rounds. This is due to the concavity of the leakage as a function of the error rate.) We
introduce the notation Paks|r = Pr[A = a,K = k, S = s|R = r].
Lemma 2 Let Alice and Bob’s bipartite state be ρ¯AB, and let them perform the measurements Q
and M(r) respectively. At given r, the joint probability of the outcomes a, k, s is given by
Paks|r =
1
4 · 2d
∑
tτ
(−1)at+aτ [ρ¯tkτk + ρ¯t,k+rτ,k+r + (−1)s(ρ¯tkτ,k+r + ρ¯t,k+rτk )]. (28)
Proof: Paks|r = tr (Qa ⊗M (r)ks )ρ¯AB
= tr ( 1
2d
∑
``′(−1)a`+a`′ |`〉〈`′| ⊗ 12 |k〉+(−1)
s|k+r〉√
2
〈k|+(−1)s〈k+r|√
2
)
∑
tt′ττ ′ ρ¯
tt′
ττ ′ |t〉〈τ | ⊗ |t′〉〈τ ′|
= 1
2d4
∑
tt′ττ ′ ρ¯
tt′
ττ ′(−1)at+aτ [δt′k + (−1)sδt′,k+r][δτ ′k + (−1)sδτ ′,k+r]
= 1
2d4
∑
tτ (−1)at+aτ [ρ¯tkτk + ρ¯t,k+rτ,k+r + (−1)sρ¯tkτ,k+r + (−1)sρ¯t,k+rτk ]. 
We now impose the constraint that the event s 6= s′ occurs with probability β for all combinations
(a, k, r),
∀aksr : P constraks|r =
1
2dd
[
δs,ak⊕ak+r (1− β) + (1− δs,ak⊕ak+r )β
]
. (29)
Theorem 3 The constraint (29) can only be satisfied by a density function of the form
ρ¯AB = (1− 2β − V )|α0〉〈α0|+ V 1
d
∑
tt′
|tt′〉〈t′t|+ (2β − µ) 1
d2
+ µ
1
d
∑
t
|tt〉〈tt| (30)
with µ, V ∈ R. Written componentwise,
ρ¯tt
′
ττ ′ =
1− 2β − V
d
δt′tδτ ′τ +
V
d
δτt′δτ ′t +
2β − µ
d2
δτtδτ ′t′ +
µ
d
δt′tδτtδτ ′t. (31)
Proof: We rewrite the constraint (29) as
∀aksr : P constraks|r =
1
2d2d
+
1
2 − β
2dd
(−1)s(−1)ak⊕ak+r . (32)
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Then we use the fact that ρ¯AB depends only on four real-valued constants, which we write as
u
def
= ρ¯ssss, w
def
= ρ¯stst, x
def
= ρ¯sstt , y
def
= ρ¯stts (with s 6= t and arbitrary s, t). In terms of these constants,
the probability (28) is expressed as
Paks|r =
u+ (d− 1)w
2 · 2d +
x+ y
2 · 2d (−1)
s(−1)ak⊕ak+r . (33)
Having Paks|r = P constraks|r requires setting u+ (d− 1)w = 1d and (x+ y)d = 1− 2β. The state ρ¯AB
has the form
ρ¯AB = u
∑
t
|tt〉〈tt|+ w
∑
[tt′]
|tt′〉〈tt′|+ x
∑
[tτ ]
|tt〉〈ττ |+ y
∑
[tt′]
|tt′〉〈t′t|. (34)
We choose x,w as the two independent degrees of freedom and re-parametrise them as x =
(1− 2β−V )/d and w = (2β−µ)/d2, where µ, V ∈ R are the new independent degrees of freedom.
Substitution of u = 1d − (d− 1)w, y = (1− 2β)/d− x and the re-parametrisation into (34) yields
(30). 
Theorem 3 shows that (at fixed β) there are only two degrees of freedom, µ and V , in Eve’s
manipulation of the EPR pair.
6 Purification
According to the attacker model we have to assume that Eve has the purification of the state ρ¯AB.
The purification contains all information that exists outside the AB system.
6.1 The purified state and its properties
We introduce the following notation,
|αj〉 def= 1√
d
∑
t
ei
2pi
d jt|tt〉, j ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} (35)
|D±tt′〉 def=
|tt′〉 ± |t′t〉√
2
t < t′. (36)
Lemma 3 The ρ¯AB given in (30) has the following orthonormal eigensystem,
|α0〉 with eigenvalue λ0 def= 2β − µ
d2
+
µ+ V
d
+ 1− 2β − V
|αj〉 j ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1} with eigenvalue λ1 def= 2β − µ
d2
+
µ+ V
d
. (37)
|D±tt′〉 (t < t′) with eigenvalue λ± def=
2β − µ
d2
± V
d
Proof: The term proportional to 1 in (30) yields a contribution (2β − µ)/d2 to each eigenvalue.
First we look at |αj〉. We have 〈α0|αj〉 = δj0. Furthermore 〈t′t|αj〉 = δt′tei 2pid jt/
√
d, which gives
(
∑
tt′ |tt′〉〈t′t|)|αj〉 = |αj〉. Similarly we have (
∑
t |tt〉〈tt|)|αj〉 = |αj〉. Next we look at |D±tt′〉. We
have 〈α0|D±tt′〉 = 0 and 〈uu|D±tt′〉 = 0. Hence the (1 − 2β − V )-term and the µ-term in (30)
yield zero when acting on |D±tt′〉. Furthermore
∑
uu′ |uu′〉〈u′u|D+tt′〉 =
∑
uu′ |uu′〉 δutδu′t′+δut′δu′t√2
= |D+tt′〉. Similarly,
∑
uu′ |uu′〉〈u′u|D−tt′〉 =
∑
uu′ |uu′〉 δutδu′t′−δut′δu′t√2 sgn(u− u′) = −|D
−
tt′〉. 
In diagonalised form the ρ¯AB is given by
ρ¯AB = λ0|α0〉〈α0|+ λ1
d−1∑
j=1
|αj〉〈αj |+ λ+
∑
tt′:t<t′
|D+tt′〉〈D+tt′ |+ λ−
∑
tt′:t<t′
|D−tt′〉〈D−tt′ |. (38)
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The purification is
|ΨABE〉 =
√
λ0|α0〉 ⊗ |E0〉+
√
λ1
d−1∑
j=1
|αj〉 ⊗ |Ej〉
+
√
λ+
∑
tt′:t<t′
|D+tt′〉 ⊗ |E+tt′〉+
√
λ−
∑
tt′:t<t′
|D−tt′〉 ⊗ |E−tt′〉. (39)
where we have introduced orthonormal basis states |Ej〉, |E±tt′〉 in Eve’s Hilbert space. In Ap-
pendix A we give more details on Eve’s unitary operation.
6.2 Eve’s state
Eve waits for Alice and Bob to perform their measurements and reveal k and r.
Lemma 4 After Alice has measured a ∈ {0, 1}d and Bob has measured k ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1}, s ∈
{0, 1}, Eve’s state is given by
σrkas = trAB
[
|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE|Qa ⊗M
(r)
ks ⊗ 1
Paks|r
]
. (40)
Proof: The POVM elements Qa and M
(r)
ks are proportional to projection operators. Hence the
tripartite ABE pure state after the measurement is proportional to (Qa ⊗M (r)ks ⊗ 1)|ΨABE〉. It
is easily verified that the normalisation in (40) is correct: taking the trace in E-space yields
trABtrE|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE|Qa ⊗M (r)ks ⊗ 1 = trAB ρ¯ABQa ⊗M (r)ks = Paks|r. 
Lemma 5 It holds that
d
2d
∑
a0···ad−1
without ak,ak+r
|µa〉〈µa| = 1
4
1 +
1
4
(−1)ak+ak+r
(
|k〉〈k + r|+ |k + r〉〈k|
)
(41)
= M
(r)
k,ak⊕ak+r +
1
4
∑
t: t6=k,k+r
|t〉〈t|. (42)
Proof: We have |µa〉〈µa| = 1d1+ 1d
∑
[tτ ] |t〉〈τ |(−1)at+aτ . Summation of the 1d1 term is trivial and
yields 2d−2 · 1d1. In the summation of the factor (−1)at+aτ in the second term, any summation∑
at
(−1)at yields zero. The only nonzero contribution arises when t = k, τ = k+r or t = k+r, τ =
k; the a-summation then yields a factor 2d−2. 
Lemma 6 It holds that
Ea:ak⊕ak+r=s′ |µa〉〈µa| =
1
d
+ (−1)s′ |k〉〈k + r|+ |k + r〉〈k|
d
. (43)
Proof: We have Ea:ak⊕ak+r=s′ |µa〉〈µa| = 2−(d−1)
∑
ak
∑
ak+r
δak⊕ak+r,s′ ·∑
awithout ak,ak+r
|µa〉〈µa|. For the rightmost summation we use Lemma 5. Performing the
∑
ak
and
∑
ak+r
summations yields (43). 
Eve’s task is to guess Alice’s bit s′ = ak ⊕ ak+r from the mixed state σrkas , where Eve does not
know a and s. We define
σrks′ = Es,a:ak⊕ak+r=s′ [σ
rk
as ]. (44)
This represents Eve’s ancilla state given some value of Alice’s bit s′. Next we introduce notations
that are useful for understanding the structure of σrks′ . We define, for t, t
′ ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1}, non-
normalised vectors |wtt′〉 in Eve’s Hilbert space as
|wtt′〉 def= 〈tt′|ΨABE〉. (45)
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Furthermore we define angles α and ϕ as
cos 2α
def
=
〈wkk|wk+r,k+r〉
〈wkk|wkk〉 , cos 2ϕ
def
=
〈wk,k+r|wk+r,k〉
〈wk,k+r|wk,k+r〉 (46)
and vectors |A〉, |B〉, |C〉, |D〉
|wkk〉√〈wkk|wkk〉 = cosα|A〉+ sinα|B〉 (47)
|wk+r,k+r〉√〈wk+r,k+r|wk+r,k+r〉 = cosα|A〉 − sinα|B〉 (48)
|wk,k+r〉√〈wk,k+r|wk,k+r〉 = cosϕ|C〉+ sinϕ|D〉 (49)
|wk+r,k〉√〈wk+r,k|wk+r,k〉 = cosϕ|C〉 − sinϕ|D〉. (50)
The |A〉, |B〉, |C〉, |D〉 are mutually orthogonal, and also orthogonal to any vector |wtt′〉 (t′ 6= t)
with {t, t′} 6= {k, k + r}.
Theorem 4 The eigenvalues of σrks′ are given by
ξ0
def
=
d
2
· λ+ + λ−
2
(51)
ξ1
def
= d2 (λ1 + λ−) = β − d2 (d2 − 1)(λ+ + λ−) (52)
ξ2
def
= d2 (λ1 + 2
λ0 − λ1
d
+ λ+) = 1− β − d2 (d2 − 1)(λ+ + λ−) (53)
and the diagonal representation of σrks′ is
σrks′ = ξ0
∑
t∈{0,...,d−1}
t 6=k,t 6=k+r
( |wtk〉〈wtk|
〈wtk|wtk〉 +
|wt,k+r〉〈wt,k+r|
〈wt,k+r|wt,k+r〉
)
+ξ2
[
√
ξ2 − d2λ+|A〉+ (−1)s
′
√
d
2λ+|C〉][· · ·]†
ξ2
+ξ1
[
√
ξ1 − d2λ−|B〉 − (−1)s
′
√
d
2λ−|D〉][· · ·]†
ξ1
(54)
Proof: We have
σrks′ = trAB|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE|Ea:ak⊕ak+r=s′Qa ⊗ Es|s′
M
(r)
ks
Paks|r
⊗ 1
= d2d trAB|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE|[Ea:ak⊕ak+r=s′Qa]⊗ [
∑
s
M
(r)
ks ]⊗ 1. (55)
We use Lemma 6 to evaluate the Ea factor. We use
∑
sM
(r)
ks =
1
2 |k〉〈k| + 12 |k + r〉〈k + r|. This
allows us to write everything in terms of |wtt′〉 states. For t = t′ we have
|wtt〉 =
√
λ0/d|E0〉+
√
λ1/d
d−1∑
j=1
(ei
2pi
d )jt|Ej〉 (56)
〈wtt|wtt〉 = λ1 + λ0 − λ1
d
, (57)
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and for t 6= t′ we have
|wtt′〉 =
√
λ+/2|E+(tt′)〉+ sgn(t′ − t)
√
λ−/2|E−(tt′)〉 (58)
〈wtt′ |wtt′〉 = (λ+ + λ−)/2. (59)
The following properties hold (t 6= t′)
〈wtt|wtt′〉 = 0 , 〈wtt|wt′t〉 = 0 (60)
〈wtt|wt′t′〉 = λ0 − λ1
d
, 〈wtt′ |wt′t〉 = λ+ − λ−
2
. (61)
We get
cos 2α = 1− dλ1
λ0 + (d− 1)λ1 , cos 2ϕ = 1−
2λ−
λ+ + λ−
(62)
After some tedious algebra the result (54) follows. 
Note that the σrk0 and σ
rk
1 have the same set of eigenvalues: 2(d− 2) times ξ0, and once ξ1 and ξ2.
Corollary 1 It holds that
σrk0 + σ
rk
1
2
=
∑
t∈{0,...,d−1}
t 6=k,t 6=k+r
ξ0 ·
( |wtk〉〈wtk|
〈wtk|wtk〉 +
|wt,k+r〉〈wt,k+r|
〈wt,k+r|wt,k+r〉
)
+(ξ2 − d2λ+)|A〉〈A|+ d2λ+|C〉〈C|+ (ξ1 − d2λ−)|B〉〈B|+ d2λ−|D〉〈D|.
Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 4 by discarding the terms in (54) that contain (−1)s′ (the
AC and BD crossterms). 
Corollary 2 The difference between σrk0 and σ
rk
1 can be written as
σrk0 − σrk1
2
=
1
2
√
dλ+
√
dλ− + 2(1− β)− d
2
2
(λ+ + λ−)
(
|A〉〈C|+ |C〉〈A|
)
−1
2
√
dλ−
√
dλ+ + 2β − d
2
2
(λ+ + λ−)
(
|B〉〈D|+ |D〉〈B|
)
. (63)
Proof: Using Theorem 4, we see everything except the AC and BD crossterms cancel from (54). 
7 Statistical distance; proof of Theorem 1
Now that we have described Eve’s most general allowed state, and how it is connected to Alice’s
secret bit s′, it is time to prove Theorem 1.
Let ri be the ‘r’-value in round i and similarly ki, s
′
i. We use the notation r = (r1, . . . , rn),
k = (k1, . . . , kn). Let x = (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n). Let z ∈ {0, 1}` be the QKD key obtained by applying
privacy amplification to x, i.e. z = Ext(x, u), where Ext is a universal hash function (UHF) and
u ∈ U is public randomness. At given (r,k) the quantum-classical state describing the whole
system is
ρ(r,k) = Ez∈{0,1}`Eu|z〉〈z| ⊗ |u〉〈u| ⊗ ω(z, u, r,k) (64)
ω(z, u, r,k)
def
= Ex∈{0,1}n:Ext(x,u)=z
n⊗
i=1
σrikixi (65)
= 2`−n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
δz,Ext(x,u)
n⊗
i=1
σrikixi . (66)
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We take the z-averaged of ω,
ωav(r,k)
def
= Ezω(z, u, r,k) =
n⊗
i=1
σriki0 + σ
riki
1
2
. (67)
Note that ωav does not depend on u. Furthermore we define the ‘ideal’ decoupled state as
ρid(r,k)
def
= Ezu|z〉〈z| ⊗ |u〉〈u| ⊗ ωav(r,k) (68)
and we introduce the notation ∆(z, u, r,k) = ω(z, u, r,k)− ωav(r,k).
We look at the security of Z given r,k, U and ω(Z,U, r,k). We follow definition (3) and write Z’s
distance from uniformity as
D(Z|U, r,k, ω(Z,U, r,k)) = D(ρ(r,k), ρid(r,k))
=
1
2
∥∥Ezu|z〉〈z| ⊗ |u〉〈u| ⊗∆(z, u, r,k)∥∥1 (69)
Lemma 7 It holds that
‖ρ(r,k)− ρid(r,k)‖1 = Ezu‖∆(z, u, r,k)‖1. (70)
Proof: This follows from the block structure of ρ−ρid. The list of eigenvalues of ρ−ρid is obtained
by combining the individual eigenvalue lists of the ∆(z, u, r,k) for all combinations (z, u). 
Lemma 8 It holds that
Ezu‖∆(z, u, r,k)‖1 ≤ tr
√
Ezu∆2(z, u, r,k). (71)
Proof: Ezu‖∆(z, u, r,k)‖1 = Ezutr
√
∆2(z, u, r,k) = trEzu
√
∆2(z, u, r,k). We apply Jensen’s in-
equality. 
Lemma 9 It holds that
Ezu∆
2(z, u, r,k) =
2` − 1
2n
n⊗
i=1
(σriki0 )
2 + (σriki1 )
2
2
. (72)
Proof: From the definition of ω and ωav we get
Ezu∆
2(z, u, r,k) =
22`
22n
∑
xy
Ezuδz,Ext(x,u)δz,Ext(y,u)
n⊗
i=1
σrikixi σ
riki
yi + ω
2
av
−ωav 2
`
2n
∑
x
Ezuδz,Ext(x,u)
n⊗
i=1
σrikixi
−
( 2`
2n
∑
x
Ezuδz,Ext(x,u)
n⊗
i=1
σrikixi
)
ωav. (73)
We split the
∑
xy sum into a sum with y = x and a sum with y 6= x. Then we use
∑
z δz,Ext(x,u) = 1
and
∑
z Euδz,Ext(x,u)δz,Ext(y,u) = 2
−` for y 6= x. The latter is the defining property of UHFs. Then
we rewrite
∑
xy: y 6=x as
∑
xy −
∑
xy δxy. Finally, after applying 2
−n∑
x
⊗
i σ
riki
xi = ωav, most of
the terms cancel and (72) is what remains. 
Lemma 10 It holds that
(σrk0 )
2 + (σrk1 )
2
2
=
∑
t∈{0,...,d−1}
t 6=k,t 6=`
ξ20
( |wtk〉〈wtk|
〈wtk|wtk〉 +
|wt`〉〈wt`|
〈wt`|wt`〉
)
+ ξ1(ξ1 − d2λ−)|B〉〈B|
+ξ1
d
2λ−|D〉〈D|+ ξ2(ξ2 − d2λ+)|A〉〈A|+ ξ2 d2λ+|C〉〈C|.
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Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 4. 
Lemma 11 The statistical distance between the real and ideal state can be bounded as
‖ρ(r,k)− ρid(r,k)‖1 <
√
2`−nTn (74)
T
def
= 2(d− 2)ξ0 +
√
ξ2(ξ2 − d2λ+) +
√
ξ2
d
2λ+ +
√
ξ1(ξ1 − d2λ−) +
√
ξ1
d
2λ−. (75)
Proof: Substitution of Lemma 9 into Lemma 8 into Lemma 7 gives ‖ρ(r,k) − ρid(r,k)‖1 ≤√
2`−1
2n
∏n
i=1 tr
√
(σ
riki
0 )
2+(σ
riki
1 )
2
2 . The trace does not depend on the actual value of ri and ki.
We define T = tr
√
(σrk0 )
2 + (σrk1 )
2/
√
2 for arbitrary r, k. From Lemma 10 we obtain (75). Finally
we use 2` − 1 < 2`. 
Corollary 3 Let ε be a small constant. The distance ‖ρ(r,k) − ρid(r,k)‖1 can be made equal to
ε by setting `/n = 1− 2 log T − 2n log 1ε .
Remark. Corollary 3 provides a tighter bound on the QKD rate than similar statements based
on Re´nyi-2 entropy. We are able to compute the square root in tr
√
σ20 + σ
2
1 , whereas in Re´nyi-2
entropy Jensen’s inequality is used to bound the trace as
√
dimension
√
trσ20 + trσ
2
1 .
Since Eve is still free to choose the parameters µ and V (or, equivalently, λ+ and λ−) she can
choose them such that ‖ρ(r,k)− ρid(r,k)‖1 is maximized.
Theorem 5 Eve’s choice that maximises ‖ρ(r,k)− ρid(r,k)‖1 is given by
β ≤ β∗ : T = 2β +
√
1− 2β
[√
1− 2β d− 1
d− 2 +
√
2β√
d− 2
]
(76)
at λ− = 0, λ+ =
4β
d(d− 2) (77)
β ≥ β∗ : T = 2β∗ +
√
1− 2β∗
[√
1− 2β∗ d− 1
d− 2 +
√
2β∗√
d− 2
]
(78)
at λ− =
4β∗(β − β∗)
d(d− 2)(1− 2β∗) , λ+ =
4β∗(1− β − β∗)
d(d− 2)(1− 2β∗) . (79)
Here β∗ is a saturation value that depends on d as follows,
β∗ =
xd/2
1 + xd
, (80)
where xd is the solution on (0, 1) of the equation
(1− x
d− 2)
1
2 +
d− 1
d− 2(1−
x
d− 2)
− 12 +
1√
d− 2(
√
x− 1√
x
)− 2 = 0. (81)
Proof: We start from (75). At β = 12 the expression for T is symmetric in λ+ and λ−. Hence the
overall maximum achievable at any β lies at λ+ = λ− = qd(d−2) for some as yet unknown q. We
have
T
β=
1
2
max = ζ(q, d)
def
= q +
√
1− q
(√
1− d− 1
d− 2q +
√
q√
d− 2
)
. (82)
On the other hand, we note that substitution of (77) into (75) yields (76), which is precisely of
the form ζ(q, d) if we identify 2β ≡ q. Hence, at some β < 12 it is already possible to achieve
T = T
β=1/2
max , i.e. we have saturation. We note that substitution of (79) into (75) yields (78). The
saturation value β∗ is found by solving ∂ζ(2β, d)/∂β = 0; after some simplification, this equation
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can be rewritten as (81) by setting x = 2β/(1− 2β).10 
The upper bound on the amount of information that Eve has about S′ is 2 log T . This is a concave
function of β (see Fig. 1). Hence there is no advantage for Eve to cause different error rates in
different rounds. For Eve it is optimal to cause error rate β in every round.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
The optimal λ+,λ− are plotted in Fig. 3 (Section 9).
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Fig. 1 Upper bound on the information leakage as a function of the bit error rate for d = 5, d = 10 and d = 15
(Theorem 1). A dot indicates the saturation point β∗.
Lemma 12 The large-d asymptotics of the saturation value β∗ is given by
β∗ =
1
4
− 1
8
√
d− 2 −O(
1
(d− 2)3/2 ), (83)
which yields
T = 1 +
1
2
√
d− 2 −O(
1
d− 2) (84)
‖ρ(r,k)− ρid(r,k)‖1 ≤ 2−
1
2n[1−
1√
d−2 ln 2+O( 1d−2 )− `n ]. (85)
Proof: We set xd = 1 − 1/
√
d− 2 + a/(d − 2), where a is supposedly of order 1, and substitute
this into (81). This yields a = 12 + O(1/
√
d− 2), which is indeed of order 1. Substitution of xd
into (80) gives (83), and substitution of β∗ into (78) gives (84). Finally, substitution of (84) into
Lemma 11 yields (85). 
8 Von Neumann entropy
Here we prove Theorem 2. Using smooth Re´nyi entropies it was shown in [12] that, in the large
n limit, the von Neumann leakage per qubit is the relevant quantity for determining the required
amount of PA.11 We denote the leakage from Alice to Eve, in terms of von Neumann entropy, IAE.
10 After some rewriting it can be seen that (81) is equivalent to a complicated 6th order polynomial equation.
We have not yet been able to prove that the solution on (0, 1) is unique. Our numerical solutions however indicate
that this is the case.
11 By applying Jensen’s inequality once more to lemma 8, we can move the trace into the square root and get an
expression which is equivalent to lemma 4.4 in [19]. After this point the proof structure from [19] can be followed.
Thus the Von Neumann leakage is also an asymptotic case of our statistical distance result Theorem 1.
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It is given by
IAE = S(σ
RK
S′ |RK)− S(σRKS′ |RKS′)
= Erk[S(σ
rk
S′ )− S(σrkS′ |S′)]
= Erk
[
S(
σrk0 + σ
rk
1
2
)− S(σ
rk
0 ) + S(σ
rk
1 )
2
]
= S
(σrk0 + σrk1
2
)
− S(σ
rk
0 ) + S(σ
rk
1 )
2
r, k arbitrary. (86)
In the last line we used that the eigenvalues of σrks′ and σ
rk
0 +σ
rk
1 do not actually depend on r and
k. Again λ+ and λ− can be optimized to Eve’s advantage.
Theorem 6 Eve’s choice that maximizes the von Neumann leakage is given by
β ≤ β0 : IAE = (1− 2β)h( 1
d− 2 ·
2β
1− 2β ) (87)
at λ− = 0, λ+ =
4β
d(d− 2) (88)
β ≥ β0 : IAE = (1− 2β0)h( 1
d− 2 ·
2β0
1− 2β0 ) (89)
at λ− =
4β0(β − β0)
d(d− 2)(1− 2β0) , λ+ =
4β0(1− β − β0)
d(d− 2)(1− 2β0) . (90)
Here β0 is a saturation value that depends on d as follows,
β0 =
1
2
[
1 +
1
(d− 2)(1− yd)
]−1
(91)
where yd is the unique positive root of the polynomial y
d−1 + y − 1.
Proof: We start from (86). We note that the eigenvalue set of (σrk0 + σ
rk
1 )/2 largely coincides with
that of σrk0 and σ
rk
1 (Theorem 4 and Corollary 1). What remains of (86) comes entirely from the
|A〉, |B〉, |C〉, |D〉 subspace,
IAE = ξ1 log ξ1 + ξ2 log ξ2 − (ξ2 − d2λ+) log(ξ2 − d2λ+)− d2λ+ log(d2λ+)
−(ξ1 − d2λ−) log(ξ1 − d2λ−)− d2λ− log(d2λ−)
= ξ1h(
d
2
· λ−
ξ1
) + ξ2h(
d
2
· λ+
ξ2
). (92)
We note that (92) is invariant under the transformation (β → 1 − β;λ+ ↔ λ−). At β = 1/2 we
must hence have λ+ = λ− = λ.
I
β=
1
2
AE = g(d, λ)
def
= [1− d(d− 2)λ] · h
( dλ
1− d(d− 2)λ
)
. (93)
At β = 12 , the largest leakage that Eve can cause is maxλ g(d, λ) = g(d, λ∗).
12 Next we note that
substitution of (90) into (92) yields (89); this has the same form as g(d, λ) (93) if we make the
identification λd(d − 2) = 2β0. Moreover, by setting β0 = 12λ∗d(d − 2), Eve achieves the overall
maximum leakage g(d, λ∗) already at a value of β smaller than 12 . Since the maximum leakage
cannot decrease with β, this implies that the maximum leakage saturates at β = β0 and stays
12 ∂
2g(d,λ)
∂λ2
= − d
λ
[1−d(d−2)λ]−1[1−d(d−1)λ]−1, hence g is a concave function of λ on the interval λ ∈ [0, 1
d(d−1) ],
which interval coincides with the region allowed by the constraints on µ, V . The function g has a single maximum
at some point λ∗.
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constant at ImaxAE (β) = g(d, λ∗) on the interval β ∈ [β0, 12 ]. The value g(d, λ∗) precisely equals (89).
Next we determine the value of β0. Demanding ∂g(d, λ)/∂λ = 0 at λ = λ∗ yields
log
[1− d(d− 1)λ∗]d−1
[1− d(d− 2)λ∗]d−2λ∗d = 0. (94)
This is equivalent to the polynomial equation yd−1 + y − 1 = 0 with y ∈ [0, 1] if we make the
identification y = 1 − λ∗d1−λ∗d(d−2) =
1−λ∗d(d−1)
1−λ∗d(d−2) . (It is readily seen that λ∗ ∈ [0, 1d(d−1) ] implies
y ∈ [0, 1].) This precisely matches (91), because of the optimal choice β0 = 12λ∗d(d − 2). By
Descartes’ rule of signs, the function yd−1 + y − 1 has exactly one positive root.
When β is decreased below β0, the location (λ−, λ+) of the maximum of the stationary point
of IAE leaves the ‘allowed’ triangular region; this happens at a corner of the triangle, λ− = 0,
λ+ =
4β
d(d−2) . For β < β0 this corner yields the highest achievable leakage. Substitution of (88)
into (92) yields (87). 
This concludes the proof of theorem 2.
Note that the leakage IAE is a concave function of β. Hence it is optimal for Eve to cause error
rate β in every round.
Remark. From y > 0 and (91) it follows that β0 <
1
2 · d−2d−1 .
Fig. 2 shows the von Neumann mutual information for three values of d. The optimal λ+,λ− are
plotted in Fig. 3 (Section 9).
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Fig. 2 Mutual information between Alice and Eve in terms of von Neumann entropy as a function of the bit error
rate, for d = 5, d = 10 and d = 15 (Theorem 2). A dot indicates the saturation point β0.
Lemma 13 The large-d asymptotics of the IAE is given by
β ≤ β0 : IAE = 2β
d− 2 log
(d− 2)(1− 2β)e
2β
+O(d−2) (95)
β ≥ β0 : IAE = log d
d
+O( log log d
d
). (96)
Proof: The result for β < β0 follows by doing a series expansion of (87) in the small parameter
1/(d − 2). For β > β0 we study the equation yd−1 = 1 − y. Let us try a solution of the form
y = 1− ln[(d−1)/α]d−1 for some unknown α. This yields α · {(1− ln[(d−1)/α]d−1 )d−1 d−1α } = ln d−1α . Using
the fact that limn→∞(1−x/n)n = e−x we see that the expression {· · ·} is close to 1 if it holds that
ln d−1α  d− 1, and that the equation is then satisfied by α = O(ln d), which is indeed consistent
with ln d−1α  d − 1. Substituting α = O(ln d) into the expression for y and then into (91) gives
1− 2β0 = 1ln d +O( ln ln d[ln d]2 ). Substituting this result for 1− 2β0 into (89) finally yields (96). 
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9 Collective attacks
By way of supplementary information we present a number of results about collective attacks.
These are attacks on individual qudits, i.e. Eve performs the same measurement on every individual
ancilla that she holds. First, this teaches us which kind of measurement is informative for Eve.
Second, it quantifies the gap between what is provable for general attacks and what is provable
for more restricted attacks. We compute leakage in terms of min-entropy loss and in terms of
accessible (Shannon) information. Since min-entropy is a very conservative measure we will see
that the min-entropy loss exceeds the leakage found in Theorems 1 and 2. The main interest
is in Eve’s measurement itself. The accessible information is the relevant quantity when Eve’s
quantum memory is short-lived, forcing her to perform a measurement on her ancillas before she
has observed Alice and Bob’s usage of the QKD key. As expected, the accessible information will
turn out to be smaller than the leakage of Theorems 1 and 2.
9.1 Min-entropy
Eve’s ability to distinguish between the cases s′ = 0 and s′ = 1 depends on the distance between
σrk0 and σ
rk
1 (see Section 2.2). Eq. (7) with p0 =
1
2 , p1 =
1
2 tells us that the relevant quantity is‖σrk0 − σrk1 ‖1. For notational convenience we define the value βsat,
βsat
def
=
1
4
· d− 2
d− 1 . (97)
Again we optimize λ+ and λ−.
Lemma 14 For all r, k the choice for λ+ and λ− that maximizes the trace distance 12
∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥1
is
λ+ =
4β
d(d−2) λ− = 0 for β < βsat (98)
λ+ =
4βsat
d(d−2) − 2(β−βsat)d2 λ− = 2(β−βsat)d2 for β ≥ βsat. (99)
which gives
1
2
∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥1 =

1√
d−1
√
β
βsat
√
2βsat − β for β < βsat
1√
d−1 for β ≥ βsat.
(100)
Proof: From Corollary 2 it is easy to see that
1
2
∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥1 = √dλ−
√
dλ+ + 2β − d
2
2
(λ+ + λ−)
+
√
dλ+
√
dλ− + 2(1− β)− d
2
2
(λ+ + λ−). (101)
In Appendix B we derive the λ+, λ− that maximize (101) while keeping all eigenvalues non-
negative. 
Remark. The optimal choice for λ+,λ− has the same form for all three optimizations that we have
performed. The only difference is the saturation value. Although (99) is shown in a simplified form
one can manipulate it to the same form as (79) and (90) with βsat instead of β∗ or β0.
Fig. 3 shows the optimal λ+ and λ− together with the constraints on the λ parameters for all
three optimizations. The lower dots in the figure correspond to β = 12 . For all three information
measures the optimum moves towards the top corner of the triangle for decreasing β. For β values
below the saturation point the optimum is the top corner, with λ− = 0 and λ1 = 0.
Knowing the optimal values for λ+ and λ−, we compute the min-entropy leakage.
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Fig. 3 Optimal choice of λ+ and λ− at d = 10 for statistical distance (left line), min-entropy (middle line) and
von Neumann entropy (right line). The dashed triangle represents the region for which the eigenvalues λ+, λ− and
λ1 are non-negative. The black dots indicate the optimum at β =
1
2
(dots inside the triangle) and β ≤ β∗, βsat, β0
(upper corner of the triangle). Not shown in this plot is the λ0 ≥ 0 constraint which cuts off the upper left corner
of the triangle for β > 2βsat.
Theorem 7 The min-entropy of the bit S′ given R,K and the state σRKS′ is
β < βsat : Hmin(S
′|RKσRKS′ ) = − log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
d− 1
√
β
βsat
√
2βsat − β
)
(102)
β ≥ βsat : Hmin(S′|RKσRKS′ ) = − log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
d− 1
)
. (103)
Proof: Eq. (7) with X uniform, X → S′, Y → (R,K) becomes
Hmin(S
′|RKσRKs′ ) = − log
(
1
2
+
1
2
Erk
∥∥∥1
2
σrk0 −
1
2
σrk1
∥∥∥
1
)
= − log
(
1
2
+
1
4
∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥1) (r, k arbitrary). (104)
In the last step we omitted the expectation over r and k since the trace distance does not depend
on r, k. Substitution of (100) into (104) gives the end result. 
Corollary 4 Eve’s optimal POVM T rk = (T rk0 , T rk1 ) for maximising the min-entropy leakage is
given by
T rk0 =
1
2
(
1 + |A〉〈C|+ |C〉〈A| − |B〉〈D| − |D〉〈B|
)
; T rk1 = 1− T rk0 . (105)
Proof: The trace distance in Lemma 14 is the sum of the positive eigenvalues of σrk0 − σrk1 . In
the space spanned by |A〉, |B〉, |C〉, |D〉, the optimal T0 consists of the projection onto the space
spanned by the eigenvectors corresponding to the positive eigenvalues. These eigenvectors are
|v1〉 = |A〉+|C〉√2 and |v2〉 =
|D〉−|B〉√
2
. The matrix that projects onto them is |v1〉〈v1| + |v2〉〈v2| =
1
2 |A〉〈A|+ 12 |B〉〈B|+ 12 |C〉〈C|+ 12 |D〉〈D| +|A〉〈C|+ |C〉〈A| − |B〉〈D| − |D〉〈B|. In order to satisfy
the constraint T0 + T1 = 1 and symmetry, half the identity matrix in the remaining d2 − 4 di-
mensions has to be added to T0. We mention, without showing it, that (105) satisfies the test (5). 
As expected, the min-entropy loss decreases as the dimension of the Hilbert space grows. We see
that the entropy loss saturates at β = βsat; hence RRDPS is secure up to arbitrarily high noise
levels. Fig. 4 shows the min-entropy leakage as a function of β.
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Fig. 4 Min-entropy leakage as a function of the bit error rate for d = 5, d = 10 and d = 15. A dot indicates the
saturation point βsat.
9.2 Accessible Shannon information
Lemma 15 Let X ∈ X be a uniformly distributed random variable. Let Y ∈ Y be a random
variable. Let ρxy be a quantum state coupled to the classical x, y. The Shannon entropy of X given
a state ρXY that has to be measured (for unknown X and Y ) is given by
H(X|ρXY ) = min
POVM M=(Mm)m∈X
Ex∈XH
(
{trMmEy|xρxy}m∈X
)
. (106)
Proof: We have H(X|ρXY ) = minM H(X|Z), where Z is the outcome of the POVM measure-
ment M. Z is a classical random variable that depends on X and Y . We can write H(X|Z) =
H(X)−H(Z)+H(Z|X). Since X is uniform, and Z is an estimator for X, the Z is uniform as well.
Thus we have H(X)−H(Z) = 0, which yields H(X|ρXY ) = minM H(Z|X) = minM ExH(Z|X = x).
The probability Pr[z|x] is given by Pr[z|x] = Ey|xPr[z|xy] = Ey|xtrMzρxy. 
Corollary 5 It holds that
H(S′|RKσRKAS ) = Erk minGrk=(Grk0 ,Grk1 )
Es′h(trG
rk
m σ
rk
s′ ), m ∈ {0, 1} arbitrary. (107)
Proof: Application of Lemma 15 yields
H(S′|RKσRKAS ) = Erk minGrk=(Grk0 ,Grk1 )
Es′H({trGrkmEas|s′σrkas}m∈{0,1})
= Erk minGrk=(Grk0 ,Grk1 )
Es′H({trGrkm σrks′ }m∈{0,1}) (108)
where in the last step we used the definition of σrks′ . Finally, the Shannon entropy of a binary
variable is given by the binary entropy function h, where h(1− p) = h(p). 
From Corollary 5 we see that the POVM T rk associated with the min-entropy also optimizes the
Shannon entropy: maximizing the guessing probability trGrks′ σ
rk
s′ minimizes the Shannon entropy.
Theorem 8 The Shannon entropy of Alice’s bit S′ given the state σRKAS , R and K is:
β < βsat : H(S
′|RKσRKAS ) = h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
d− 1
√
β
βsat
√
2βsat − β
)
. (109)
β ≥ βsat : H(S′|RKσRKAS ) = h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
d− 1
)
. (110)
Proof: The min-entropy result (102,103) can be written as Hmin(S
′|RKσRKS′ ) = − log trT rks′ σrks′ , so
we already have an expression for trT rks′ σ
rk
s′ . Substitution of T rk for Grk in (107) yields the result.

Since the optimal POVM for min- and Shannon entropy are the same, saturation occurs at the
same point (β = βsat). Fig 5 shows the Shannon entropy leakage (mutual information) IAE =
1− H(S′|RKσRKAS ) as a function of β.
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Fig. 5 Accessible Shannon entropy as a function of β for d = 5, d = 10 and d = 15. A dot indicates the saturation
point βsat.
10 Discussion
10.1 Comparison with previous analyses
Our Theorem 1 is non-asymptotic; we cannot compare it to previous results since the previous
results are for the asymptotic regime. Figs. 6 and 7 show our results versus previous bounds on the
leakage. It is clear that our on Neumann result is sharper than [17] for all β and d. Interestingly,
our non-asymptotic result for the saturated leakage is sharper than the asymptotic [17] for d ≤ 22.
Note too that saturation occurs at lower β (especially for small d) than reported in [17].
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Fig. 6 Saturated leakage as a function of d. Comparison of [14] and our results (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2).
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Fig. 7 Leakage as a function of β, for d = 16. Comparison of our Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 versus [17], h( 2β
d−2 )
below and h( 1
d−1 ) above saturation.
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10.2 Remarks on the optimal attack
The ρ¯AB mixed state allowed by the noise constraint has two degrees of freedom, µ and V . While
this is more than the zero degrees of freedom in the case of qubit-based QKD [12], it is still a small
number, given the dimension d2 of the Hilbert space.
Eve’s attack has an interesting structure. Eve entangles her ancilla with Bob’s qudit. Bob’s mea-
surement affects Eve’s state. When Bob reveals r, k, Eve knows which 4-dimensional subspace is
relevant. However, the basis state |k〉 in Bob’s qudit is coupled to |Aak〉 in Eve’s space (see appendix
A), which is spanned by d− 1 different basis vectors |E+(kt′)〉 (Eq. 114 with λ1 = 0, λ− = 0), each
carrying different phase information ak ⊕ at′ . Only one out of d − 1 carries the information she
needs, and she cannot select which one to read out. Her problem is aggravated by the fact that
the |Aat 〉 vectors are not orthogonal (except at β = 12 ). Note that this entanglement-based attack
is far more powerful than the intercept-resend attack studied in [18].
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A Details of Eve’s unitary operation
In Theorem 9 below we show that Eve does not have to touch Alice’s qudit. Hence the attacks that we are describing
here can also be carried out in the original (non-EPR) protocol, where Eve gets access only to the qudit state sent
to Bob.
Theorem 9 The operation that maps the pure EPR state to |ΨABE〉 (39) can be represented as a unitary operation
on Bob’s subsystem and Eve’s ancilla.
Proof: Let Eve’s ancilla have initial state |E0〉. The transition from the pure EPR state to (39) can be written as
the following mapping,
U
(
|t〉B ⊗ |E0〉E
)
= |Ωt〉, (111)
where |Ωt〉 is a state in the BE system defined as
|Ωt〉 def=
√
λ0|t〉|E0〉+
√
λ1|t〉
d−1∑
j=1
ei
2pi
d
jt|Ej〉+
√
dλ+
2
∑
t′:t′ 6=t
|t′〉|E+
(tt′)〉+
√
dλ−
2
∑
t′:t′ 6=t
|t′〉|E−
(tt′)〉sgn(t′− t). (112)
The notation (tt′) indicates ordering of t and t′ such that the smallest index occurs first. It holds that 〈Ωt|Ωτ 〉 = δtτ .
Eqs. (111,112) show that the attack can be represented as an operation that does not touch Alice’s subsystem. Next
we have to prove that the mapping is unitary. The fact that 〈Ωt|Ωτ 〉 = δtτ shows that orthogonality in Bob’s space
is correctly preserved. In order to demonstrate full preservation of orthogonality we have to define the action of the
operator U on states of the form |t〉B ⊗ |ε〉E, where |ε〉 is one of Eve’s basis vectors orthogonal to |E0〉, in such a
way that the resulting states are mutually orthogonal and orthogonal to all |Ωt〉, t ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}. The dimension
of the BE space is d3 and allows us to make such a choice of d(d2 − 1) vectors. 
Theorem 10 Let Alice send the state |µa〉 to Bob. Let Eve apply the unitary operation U (specified in the proof
of Theorem 9) to this state and her ancilla. The result can be written as
U
(
|µa〉 ⊗ |E0〉
)
=
1√
d
d−1∑
t=0
(−1)at |t〉 ⊗ |Aat 〉, (113)
|Aat 〉 def=
√
λ0|E0〉+
√
λ1
d−1∑
j=1
ei
2pi
d
jt|Ej〉+
√
d
2
∑
t′:t′ 6=t
(−1)at+at′
[√
λ+|E+(tt′)〉+
√
λ−sgn(t′ − t)|E−(tt′)〉
]
. (114)
The states |Aat 〉 are normalised and satisfy ∀tτ :τ 6=t 〈Aaτ |Aat 〉 = (1− 2β).
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Proof: We start from U(|µa〉|E0〉) = (1/
√
d)
∑
t(−1)at |Ωt〉 and we substitute (112). Re-labeling of summation
variables yields (113,114). The norm 〈Aat |Aat 〉 equals λ0 + (d− 1)λ1 + d(d−1)2 λ+ +
d(d−1)
2
λ−, which equals 1 since
this is also equal to the trace of ρ˜AB. For τ 6= t the inner product 〈Aaτ |Aat 〉 yields
λ0 + λ1
d−1∑
j=1
ei
2pi
d
j(t−τ) +
d
2
∑
t′ 6=t
∑
τ ′ 6=τ
(−1)at+at′+aτ+aτ′ δt′τ δτ ′t[λ+ + λ−sgn(t′ − t)sgn(τ ′ − τ)]. (115)
We use
∑d−1
j=1 e
i 2pi
d
j(t−τ) = dδτt − 1 = −1. Furthermore the Kronecker deltas in (115) set the phase (−1)··· to 1
and sgn(t′ − t)sgn(τ ′ − τ) = sgn(τ − t)sgn(t− τ) = −1. Finally we use λ0 − λ1 = 1− 2β− V and λ+ − λ− = 2V/d.

Theorem 10 reveals an intuitive picture. In the noiseless case (β = 0) it holds that ∀t |Aat 〉 = |E0〉, i.e. Eve does
nothing, resulting in the factorised state |µa〉|E0〉. In the case of extreme noise (β = 12 ) we have 〈Aat |Aaτ 〉 = δtτ ,
which corresponds to a maximally entangled state between Bob and Eve.
Corollary 6 The pure state (113) in Bob and Eve’s space gives rise to the following mixed state ρBa in Bob’s
subsystem,
ρBa = (1− 2β)|µa〉〈µa|+ 2β
1
d
. (116)
Proof: Follows directly from (113) by tracing out Eve’s space and using the inner product 〈Aaτ |Aat 〉 = (1− 2β) for
τ 6= t. 
From Bob’s point of view, what he receives is a mixture of the |µa〉 state and the fully mixed state. The interpolation
between these two is linear in β. Note that the parameters µ, V are not visible in ρBa .
B Optimization for the min-entropy
Here we prove that (98,99) maximizes (101). We first show that (101) is concave and obtain the optimum for
β ≥ βsat. Then we take into account the constraints on the eigenvalues and derive the optimum for β < βsat.
Unconstrained optimization. For notational convenience we define
w1 =
√
dλ+ + 2β − d
2
2
(λ+ + λ−) (117)
w2 =
√
dλ− + 2(1− β)− d
2
2
(λ+ + λ−). (118)
This allows us to formulate everything in terms of λ+ and λ−. Eq. (101) becomes
1
2
∥∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥∥
1
=
√
dλ−w1 +
√
dλ+w2. (119)
Next we compute the derivatives,
∂
∂λ+
∥∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥∥
1
= −d
2
2
√
λ+
w2
+
w2√
λ+
+ (d− d
2
2
)
√
λ−
w1
. (120)
∂
∂λ−
∥∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥∥
1
= −d
2
2
√
λ−
w1
+
w1√
λ−
+ (d− d
2
2
)
√
λ+
w2
. (121)
Setting both these derivatives to zero yields a stationary point of the function. Setting w1
√
λ+
∂
∂λ+
∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥1
−w2
√
λ− ∂∂λ−
∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥1 to zero gives λ+w21 − λ−w22 = 0, which describes a hyperbola
( 1
2
d2 − d)(λ2− − λ2+) + 2βλ+ − 2(1− β)λ− = 0. (122)
Next, the equations
√
λ+w1w2
∂
∂λ+
∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥1 = 0 and√
λ−w1w2 ∂∂λ−
∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥1 = 0 can both easily be written in the form
w2
w1
= expression. Equating these two expressions gives us another hyperbola,
(
d2λ+ +
d2
2
λ− − dλ− − 2(1− β)
)(
d2λ− +
d2
2
λ+ − dλ+ − 2β
)
− λ−λ+(d− d
2
2
) = 0. (123)
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The stationary point lies at the crossing of these two hyperbolas. There are four crossing points,
λ+ = 0 ; λ− =
4(1− β)
d(d− 2) (124)
λ+ =
4β
d(d− 2) ; λ− = 0 (125)
λ+ =
1
2d(d− 1) +
1− 2β
d2
; λ− =
1
2d(d− 1) −
1− 2β
d2
(126)
λ+ =
2 + d(1− 2β)
2d2
; λ− =
2− d(1− 2β)
2d2
. (127)
In the steps above, we have multiplied our derivatives by λ+, λ−, w1 and w2; this has introduced spurious zeros
that now need to be removed. From (120,121) it is easily seen that λ+ = 0 and λ− = 0 are never stationary points
since the derivatives diverge near these values. Furthermore, we find that substitution of (127) into the derivatives
does not yield two zeros. Expression (126) is the only stationary point. As the function value lies higher there than
in other points, we conclude that
∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥1 is concave.
Constrained optimization. The optimization problem is constrained by the fact that the λ eigenvalues are non-
negative. For β ≥ βsat the stationary point satisfies the constraints and hence is the optimal choice for β ≥ βsat.
For β < βsat the stationary point has λ− < 0, i.e. it lies outside the allowed region. Because of the concavity the
highest function value which satisfies the constraints occurs at λ0 = 0, λ1 = 0, λ+ = 0 or λ− = 0. It is easily seen
that λ0 ≥ 0 implies λ+ ≤ 1d−1 − 2βd and λ1 ≥ 0 implies λ+ ≤ 4βd(d−2) − dd−2λ− and λ− ≤ 4βd2 − d−2d λ+. In the
range β < βsat it holds that
4β
d(d−2) <
1
d−1 − 2βd ; hence the λ0-constraint is irrelevant in this region. We get λ1 = 0
when λ+ =
4β
d(d−2) − dd−2λ−. Substitution gives 12
∣∣∣∣σrk0 − σrk1 ∣∣∣∣1 =√
2
d−2
√
2(1− β) + d(1− 2β + d (1− 2β(d− 1)λ−)) (d2λ− − 4β) which has its maximum at λ− = 0 for non-negative
values of λ−. So either λ− = 0 or λ+ = 0. This leaves two options for the maximum at low β,
λ+ = 0 ; λ− =
4β
d2
⇒ 1
2
∥∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥∥
1
= 0. (128)
λ− = 0 ; λ+ =
4β
d(d− 2) ⇒
1
2
∥∥∥σrk0 − σrk1 ∥∥∥
1
= 2
√
2
√
β(d− 2)− 2β2(d− 1)
d− 2 . (129)
Clearly (129) is the larger of the two and therefore the optimal choice. 
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